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Reply to Winterhalder’s Behavioral and Other Human
Ecologies: Critique, Response and Progress through Criticism1
SUZANNE JOSEPH2
Introduction
In anthropology, the primary goal is understanding the human condition, what makes humans human or explaining human variation and
change. To critically assess what a given theory has
to offer anthropological attempts to understand the
human condition requires a detailed understanding of a theory and its components. For some it
may seem that there is a contradiction between the
goal of theory-building and that of holism. After
all, theories often make generalizations and attempt
to simplify in order to understand. However, holism, as a fundamental principle of anthropology,
goes for the big picture. That is, holism emphasizes that in order to understand a cultural system
one must understand the “relations,” “webs,” or
“interactions” between different subsystems or institutions—social, political, economic, religious,
etc. Holism is invaluable in guarding against overly
facile theoretical conclusions that are based on partial or single aspects of the human condition. While
holism does not prevent retaining elements of simplicity in understanding human variation and
change, simplifications or theoretical generalizations should be consistent with general anthropological insights as to what it means to be human.
Attention to scale is crucial, for some simplifications might only apply to interactions at particular levels of human social organization. And, sometimes, theoretical simplifications may turn out to
be flawed.
So what about Anthropological Evolutionary
Behavioral Ecology (AEBE)? Theories or paradigms
which rest on unverified assumptions and faulty
premises are likely to produce questionable simplifications. In AEBE, many simplifications or gen1

eralizations about human behavior are based on
unverified assumptions about optimality or adaptation. Similarly, theoretical interpretations of human behaviors rest on premises as to the meaning
of “reproductive success” and the organism/environment dichotomy, which are untenable in human sociocultural systems. Theories which seek to
establish a universal predictable human nature or
identify a single currency (such as reproductive
success) for understanding human behavior without seriously considering the role of culture and
historical difference are especially prone to erroneous simplification. Likewise, theories that place
primary emphasis on prediction are likely to be
limited. Predictive success cannot be used as the
principal criteria for evaluating a theory. The reason being that disparate theories often make similar predictions. The more important question is
how well does the theory explain empirical observations? In order to address this question we must
turn to the conceptual roster of theory. The question then becomes: does the theory have rich, welldeveloped or elaborated concepts and framework
for explaining cultural and ecological difference?
In the case of AEBE, the principal focus is on
simple predictive models. No serious attention is
given to the role of culture. Most empirical observations are interpreted in light of the biological
process of natural selection. It is virtually impossible to challenge or contain adaptationist arguments in AEBE because adaptation is assumed.
This means that explanations of successful predictions rest on functionalist reasoning. And because
no strict conditions or rigorous requirements must
be met before invoking adaptationism (the “theo-
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retical safeguards” mentioned in Winterhalder’s
response do not hold up to careful scrutiny),
adaptationist arguments are virtually unbounded
or limitless. In short, the expansion of the domain
of AEBE is almost limitless. Can such a theory
contribute to our understanding of human variation and change? The likely answer is yes, in some
ways; but its explanatory potential is likely to be
rather limited, particularly when it comes to understanding human sociocultural systems. As a result, I conclude in this reply (as in my original
critique) that it is necessary to delimit the domain of AEBE. I further indicate that in order to
understand the complex behavioral patterning of
our species in both time and space, more robust
theoretical structure than that found within AEBE
is needed.
The reply is divided into three sections. In
Section I: Reply to Winterhalder’s Comments on the
Critique Itself, I further utilize the Pickett et al.
(1994) method for theory to address Winterhalder’s
response to my original critique, with emphasis on
major theoretical flaws raised in my critique of AEE
and reexamined in light of Winterhalder’s arguments. In terms of suggestions for refining AEE or
AEBE, my suggestions, while not antithetical to
Winterhalder’s, contain some important disagreements. For one, Winterhalder suggests that AEBE’s
theoretical shortcomings can be addressed through
more careful empirical research. However, I argue
that many of the problems with AEBE stem from
inadequate basic conceptual devices and theoretical framework. Theoretical concepts and frameworks interpret and give meaning to empirical
phenomena. Likewise, empirical phenomena can
often lead to the development of additional concepts or frameworks. Thus, it is essential that we
examine how conceptual and empirical components of theory interact and mutually affect one
another. Otherwise, we are left with an inadequate
understanding of the potential and limitations of
a given theory. In Section II: Reply to Winterhalder’s
Comments on Critique as Practice, I make some brief
comments on Winterhalder’s suggestions for writing effective critique. In particular, I highlight the
general uses and limitations of critique toward
theory-building and refinement. And in the final
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section, Section III: Toward a More Inclusive Human Evolutionary Ecology, I indicate the need for a
more synthetic human evolutionary ecology—one
that includes a more holistic framework for understanding human ecosystems.
Section I: Reply To Winterhalder’s Comments
on the Critique Itself
In critically evaluating AEBE, I employ the
Pickett et al. (1994) method for theory (referred to
as the PK&J method for theory). Thus, while I share
Winterhalder’s desire to achieve progress through
criticism, I disagree that the PK&J method for
theory is too complex. Actually, the PK&J method
for theory is quite simple. Pickett et al. (1994) identify four major components of theory (for a list
and definition of components see Box 1 Joseph
2000:7): (1) Conceptual Devices (i.e., assumptions,
definitions, concepts); ( 2) Empirical Content (observations, facts, confirmed generalizations); (3)
Derived Conceptual Devices (hypotheses, models,
theorems); and (4) Theory Framework and Structure (framework, domain and translation modes).
The columns in Figure 1 in Joseph (2000:7), simply characterize the level of development of theory
(for definitions of different stages of development
see Box 2 Joseph 2000:8). That is, well-developed
theory has clear derived conceptual constructs,
richer and more explicit conceptual and empirical
components, more thoroughly refined overall components, and greater clarification of their interrelationship. Perhaps the most important contribution of the PK&J method for theory is that it highlights the relationship between different components of theory, particularly the link between the
empirical and conceptual components. Without an
appreciation of this link, scientific explanation in
anthropology remains elusive. Explanation is defined as the “act of relating conceptual constructs
to observable phenomena” (Pickett et al. 1994:31).
Another strength of the PK&J method for theory
is that it has incorporated fundamental developments in the history of science. The new philosophy of science recognizes that theory can take plural forms and is not reducible to the “statement
view” of theory (which took the stated laws of
motion from classical Newtonian physics as the
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primary model for all scientific theories). Scientific theories now incorporate multiple causality
(Salmon 1984), emphasize explanation (as defined
above), incorporate multiple methods for confirmation of theory (Lloyd 1988) (in addition to falsification), and examine historical influences on phenomena under study (see Pickett et al. 1994:12-19).
Thus, it is not so much that criteria from Kuhn
(1977) and McMullin (1983) are incorrect but incomplete and in need of revisions which incorporate additional key developments in the history of
science.
My original critique refers to Evolutionary
Behavioral Ecology, often referred to as evolutionary ecology and which I term Anthropological
Evolutionary Ecology (AEE) to differentiate from
Biological Evolutionary Ecology. The important
point is that the critique does not include Evolutionary Psychology or Boyd and Richerson’s (1985)
dual inheritance theory. While these might be considered sister disciplines, there are still some important theoretical distinctions between them. (For
a critique of Evolutionary Psychology see Lloyd
2001.) Winterhalder conceives of evolutionary psychology and dual inheritance theory as being part
of a larger theoretical family of evolutionary ecology. Either way, the important point is that we agree
on what is and is not included in the critique. It
seems that Anthropological Evolutionary Behavioral Ecology (AEBE) might be more amenable to
Winterhalder’s conceptualization, and thus I use
it throughout the reply.
My major criticism of AEBE is that the domain 3 is much narrower than its current
conceptualization. To examine the domain of
theory is not to partake in bleak or obscure philosophical blather, but to examine a specific and indispensable component of theory. As PK&J state:
“The first explicit component of theory that must
be specified is its domain. Without a stated do3
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main, it will not be clear to what the theory applies, nor how the universe [of discourse] might
expand, contract, or subdivide as the theory is refined and tested” (Pickett et al. 1994:91). The domain of theory is not static. It changes as concepts
are refined and elaborated and as empirical-conceptual components of theory inform one another.
However, by locating or relocating (as theory develops) the scale in time and space to which a theory
belongs, we have better clues as to its potential
applications or misapplications. PK&J sum it up
best: “Domain must be specified as explicitly as
possible, otherwise important assumptions about
the nature and function of phenomena may remain hidden . . . Spatial and temporal scale and
hierarchical level of organization are critical aspects
of the scale of a domain. Failing to specify them
may result in misapplication of the theories or
models” (1994:33).
Because AEBE as a paradigm relies heavily
on Darwin’s biological theory of natural selection,
one might be tempted to think that it has universal applicability. But even in biology, the proper
domain of the Darwinian theory of natural selection is being examined and refined. There is a growing understanding and appreciation that the Darwinian process of natural selection does not adequately explain salient empirical examples of biological evolutionary change (see Joseph 2000:10-12).
Winterhalder’s contention that my examples of
theoretical refinements to the scope of Darwinian
theory of natural selection “have no purchase” since
neo-Darwinian theory will provide the “necessary
micro-foundations for understanding natural processes at all scales” (Winterhalder 2002:9) misses
the point. The important point is that there are
important refinements being made and biological
scientists are beginning to better appreciate the
multiple conditions under which evolution by
natural selection will occur. That is, biological sci-

Winterhalder (2002:6 footnote 3) incorrectly states that “domain” is not a component of theory in PK&J’s method for
theory. It is the first component of theory mentioned in the “Components of Theory” (see Pickett et al. 1994:59, 82-83,
91, 32). Likewise, “theorem” was not added but can either be listed independently or subsumed under “models” (see
Pickett et al. 1994:71-72). “Laws” was removed, however, because it is generally recognized by social scientists that laws in
human social systems take such a highly contingent form that “confirmed generalizations” may be more apt for describing
empirically confirmed relationships, constraints and dynamics in human ecosystems.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol6/iss1/2 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.6.1.2
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entists now recognize the domain of Darwinian
theory, which includes an understanding of its limitations. These developments in evolutionary biology (and others from the study of hierarchy in ecology) also suggest that there is no expectation “that
higher-level explanations in biology, psychology,
economics, and sociology ultimately will be reduced to, or eliminated by, micro-explanations”
(Trout 1991:391). That is, better appreciation for
the scope or domain of theory implies that there is
no need for reductionism, the requirement that a
correct explanation can only be achieved by reducing a situation to the lowest possible hierarchical
level. The current approach to hierarchy theory in
ecology suggests that fundamental questions can
be asked at any level of organization so that the
explanation of multiple interactions at one level
requires explanations of constraints found at
broader scales, while mechanisms for those interactions will be found at a finer level (either below
the level of immediate interest or close to it) (see
Pickett et al. 1994:23-24, Allen and Hoekstra
1992). Either way, there is an important need in
anthropology to limit the domain of neo-Darwinian theory and hence AEBE (since the cornerstone
of explanation in AEBE is the Darwinian theory
of adaptation by natural selection). An even more
pressing reason to limit the domain of AEBE is
that ecological anthropologists are faced with the
additional challenge of understanding cultural
evolution.
Winterhalder disagrees that the domain of
AEBE is too broad. He provides examples of qualifying statements from his work and from his and
Smith’s work (see Winterhalder 2002:8,11) which
sufficiently demonstrate a recognition (early in
theory development) that the domain of AEBE
was limited. Such statements, which acknowledge
theoretical limitations, are exceptions which only
prove the rule, since they did not lead to the restriction but rather an expansion of the domain of
AEBE. Winterhalder recognizes that behaviors are
complex (i.e., “Foraging behavior is complex,”
quoted in Winterhalder 2002:8). He also acknowledges that AEBE models are simple: “scholars
adopting this approach generally are committed
to the use of simple, formal models as heuristic
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devices for generating testable hypotheses from the
more general propositions found in theory”
(Winterhalder 2002:4). But there is no parallel
recognition within AEBE that formal models and
unverified assumptions of these models seriously
restrict or limit the explanatory scope of theory.
Rather, the simplicity of formal models (with their
unverified assumptions of optimality or adaptive
efficiency) have provided ample and seemingly limitless opportunity for generating hypotheses and
“expanding their domain [that of AEBE] as experience warrants” (Winterhalder 2002:9).
And within AEBE, experience seems to have
warranted some rather major expansions. The farreaching applicability of simple models seems to
have come as an unexpected surprise to its practitioners. Winterhalder writes: “I had no prescience
that a decade later a colleague and I would find an
application of the models to human fertility decisions that may be relevant to the explanation of
demographic transitions, agricultural intensification, and socio-cultural variation in fertility”
(2002:8). Other expansions of the domain include
questions of “resource distribution . . . social hierarchy . . . hominid origins” and “multiple other
topics” (Winterhalder 2002:5).
Winterhalder goes on to argue that AEBE
forays into new domains of inquiry (such as demographic transition or fertility variation) are simply a matter of applying the theory to different
“topical” areas. However, these topical areas deal
with fundamental questions at specific time scales
and levels of social organization. For example, demographic transition is a multi-leveled process and
one that Fricke (1990:117) reminds us has only
occurred among a culture-bearing species. So that
to causally “explain” demographic transitions, for
example, requires at a minimum a specification of
1) the time-scales (transition is a historical process
after all) and spatial-scales or levels of social organization of the transition in human history with
which a researcher is interested (e.g., individuals;
class/ethnic groups; village/community; nationstate; macroregion/world-systems); 2) the sociocultural and ecological dynamics in fertility, mortality or migration at a certain scale(s) with which
a researcher is concerned (such interactions or dy-
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namics may or may not be causally connected); 3)
the broader constraints or possibilities (e.g., historical, socio-cultural and political structures)
which help explain the interactions or patterns of
interest at a given level(s) to the researcher; and 4)
attention to finer scale(s) where biocultural mechanisms for those patterns or interactions at specific
points in time and space are to be found.
AEBE with its strict methodological individualism, reductionism and insufficient attention to
the importance of scale, as well as its emphasis on
the neo-Darwinian biological concept of adaptation as an explanatory concept, can only contribute limited insights to our understanding of demographic transitions. To slightly digress, does this
mean that a theory or theorist must always be holistic and invoke multiple scales and multiple environments in order to make a contribution to fundamental theoretical questions? No, but we have
to do a better job of specifying the domain of theory
so we can better assess where a given theory’s contribution to fundamental questions in anthropology does lie. For example, biological anthropologists and demographers who examine the proximate determinants of fertility in a given population (see Bongaarts and Potter 1983, Campbell and
Wood 1988, Wood 1990) are clearly contributing
to our understanding of the mechanisms involved
in demographic variation and change. Without an
understanding of the biocultural mechanisms of
fertility within and between populations, we are
left with an incomplete causal explanation of demographic transitions.
Winterhalder acknowledges the expansion of
the domain of AEBE, but paradoxically does not
recognize this “expansion” as a question of scale.4
Perhaps this explains why Winterhalder ultimately
questions the importance of trying to establish
4
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domain itself: “If predicting domain is impractical, it also may be philosophically suspect. K&M
argue that the progress of a science can be evaluated positively if its domain grows in ways not foreseen by its initiators” (2002:9).
The expansion of the domain of AEBE should
come as no surprise to its practitioners. It is both
foreseeable and predictable; it is built into the
theory itself. A priori assumptions of adaptationism
allow for virtually limitless expansion of the domain of AEBE. Thus, the debate over the domain
of AEBE can only be resolved by confronting the
use of adaptation as a concept and framework
within AEBE. The Darwinian theory of natural
selection does not have unlimited applications to
our understanding of the human condition. As
social scientists, we have to guard against uncritical and improper use of the concept of adaptation
as a kind of “Open Sesame” (see Hallpike 1988)
to “explain” every unusual practice or institution
(see Joseph 2000:20). Winterhalder seems to recognize that this is a serious issue. He reproaches
me for not offering insights and even accuses me
of using epithets: “The theoretical safeguards
sought by HBE advocates should be cause for study
and analysis, and where possible improvement, but
that kind of effort is not found here. If Joseph has
means of helping us or her fellow social scientists
understand better than we do the issues of functionalism or adaptationism, it would be more productive for her to share those insights than to repeat epithets like ‘naïve.’” (2002:12).
First, I do not use “epithets.” If Winterhalder
is referring to my discussion of Vayda’s criticism of
“naïve functionalism,” this is not an epithet, but
highlights an important weakness of the theoretical framework (see Joseph 2000:19-20). Second, I
offer suggestions that specific components of theory

Winterhalder mentions scale with regard to life history theory only to question its importance as a potential limitation
of the subtheory. He states that “Analyses by Wilson and Daly (1997) refute Joseph’s claim (p. 19) that life history theory
is of interest only to inter-specific or higher taxonomic comparisons” (2002:12). However, in their research on life
expectancy, socio-economic inequality, homicide and reproductive timing in Chicago neighborhoods, Wilson and Daly
(1997) do not unambiguously claim to be causally explaining their findings in terms of life history theory. The authors
are more cautious: “The number of likely feedback loops among the phenomena of interest is daunting” (1997:1274).
Their discussion illustrates the problem with applying natural selectionism (with its strict dichotomy between organismic variation and environmental selection—a necessary distinction for separating evolutionary theory from teleological
arguments) to the study of human sociocultural systems where the organism/environment distinction is untenable (for a
discussion see Joseph 2000:22; see also footnote 8 in this paper).
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol6/iss1/2 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.6.1.2
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be rejected or revised and discuss an important “safeguard” against facile adaptationism which I will revisit later in my response. Nevertheless, Winterhalder
does not take these suggestions seriously. Thus, before discussing suggestions for improving AEBE, let
us examine the “theoretical safeguards” already
present to which Winterhalder refers.
Perhaps the most interesting point
Winterhalder raises is that my critique fails to appreciate the limited use of adaptation or optimal
adaptations as assumptions or concepts in AEBE
(2002:12), which inform derived conceptual devices (formal models and hypotheses), and in turn
affect the interpretation of empirical observations.
Winterhalder states that such assumptions are “justified by the directional tendency of selective processes; it [optimization] provides a framework for
generating testable predictions” (2002:12). This
assumes that evolutionary change is largely natural selection-driven (see Joseph 2000:12 for discussion of refutations in evolutionary biology) and
that cultural evolution can be understood by invoking the biological process of natural selection.
However, Winterhalder states that such assumptions are really more tactical than actual claims
about social reality. Such “premises” are not designed to test if optimal adaptations occur but how
they occur. Ultimately, such assumptions are used
for hypothesis-testing convenience. That is, AEBE
uses “simple, formal models as heuristic devices for
generating testable hypotheses about resource use,
reproductive and social behavior, and life history
traits” (Winterhalder 2002:4 Abstract). Formal
models and predictive hypotheses are thus primarily used to teach us about the (assumed) potential
workings of adaptation.
This would be an effective safeguard if the
conclusions derived from such predictive statements (hypotheses) or formal models were always
carefully qualified by statements like: “The conclusions generated from simple predictive models
or hypotheses are at best of heuristic value since
they do not test the general proposition that nature optimizes, but rather optimization is built into
the theory itself and cannot be tested,” or “Formal
models in AEBE are better seen as heuristic models of behavior and should not be seen as provid-
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ing adequate explanations of observed behaviors.
Likewise, hypotheses in AEBE are limited heuristics. That is, even if they are confirmed by empirical case studies, it is problematic to explain
these empirical observations by invoking the concept of ‘optimal adaptations’ since these are builtin or a priori assumptions used to generate predictive statements.”
The use of adaptationism in AEBE has produced “common misunderstanding” [(as
Winterhalder calls it (2002:12)], because its use in
AEBE is confusing. Practitioners claim that they
are “explaining” behavior (e.g., Borgerhoff-Mulder
1987, Turke 1988, Low 1990, Cronk 1991b).
However, not only is prediction not equivalent to
explanation (see discussion of Vayda’s argument in
Joseph 2000:19) but as an assumed premise
adaptationism in AEBE is a problematic conceptual and theoretical framework for generating explanation. Ultimately, the limited explanatory potential of AEBE’s conceptual framework and derived conceptual devices should become incorporated into formulations of the theory itself and not
simply left to each individual practitioner. The
reader then has well-formulated and established
guidelines which aid the interpretation of conclusions and empirical findings which rest on derived
conceptual devices.
Winterhalder also discusses another “safeguard” against functionalist adaptationist arguments, that is “the requirement that models of ecological circumstances be matched by those of evolutionary mechanism” (Winterhalder 2002:12).
This is an example of another safeguard that isn’t
working. Cronk identifies the primary goal of
AEBE as “deciphering the ultimate causes of behaviors by examining their reproductive consequences in living populations and by determining
their adaptive significance for our ancestors”
(1991a:29, italics mine). That is, “proximate
mechanisms,” are treated as “means” to the “end”
goal of biological reproductive success. For example, Turke (1988) writes that “individuals should
have evolved to be pleased by fulfilling proximate
goals that maximize (or at least recently maximized)
inclusive fitness” (p. 185) and “social and economic
success has always been an important step toward

30

Journal of Ecological Anthropology

[biological] reproductive success” (Turke 1989:71).
Likewise, Cronk (1991b) describes how “culturally defined values and goals are proximate means
of enhancing reproductive success” (p. 345). Voland
(1998) writes “ Through diverse mechanisms, socioeconomic success secures reproductive success”
(p. 352).
In order to demonstrate neo-Darwinian
adaptationism, AEBE practitioners must merely
show how, not if “proximate” “cultural” factors
track “ultimate” “biological success” (see Cronk
1994:183-184; Cronk 1991a, 1991b). This means
that if practitioners can demonstrate that “proximate” “cultural” factors correlate with “biological”
“reproductive success,” then voila, we have a confirmed case of adaptationism.5 Betzig (1988) provides a summary of numerous empirical studies
which confirm the correlation between “status” or
wealth (“cultural success”) and fertility (“biological success”) among men (pp. 4-6) and women (pp.
6-7). A discussion of some of the proximate sociocultural mechanisms (such as polygyny, age at
first marriage and spouse’s age at first marriage)
which “promote reproductive success” among men
is also provided (pp. 5-6). Thus, what we find in
AEBE is functionalist interpretation of reproductive variation as indications of greater or lesser
“adaptive efficiency” or “reproductive success.”
Culture is casually brushed over as a means to an
end. The “real” explanation for people’s behavior
is biological striving for “reproductive success.”
Furthermore, in addition to theoretical assumptions of how natural selection has “designed” individuals who are best adapted (in terms of inclusive reproductive success) to their environment,
there is yet another problematic premise. Within
AEBE variation in fertility is taken to mean varia5
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tion in “reproductive success.” That is, there is the
implicit or explicit premise that reproduction is
solely a biological phenomena and indicator of
“biological success.” However, this premise is incorrect because in human societies, reproduction is
both a biological and cultural phenomena (see
Bongaarts and Potter 1983, Campbell and Wood
1988). So discussions about “cultural success” tracking “biological success” are actually nothing more
than discussions of how culture tracks culture or
how biology and culture interact and mutually
effect each other in complex ways (see also the discussion of problems with cultural selectionism in
Joseph 2000:22).
So, what happens, in the above examples described by Betzig (1988), if you don’t accept as ipso
facto that “reproductive success” is synonymous
with “biological success?” What happens if you
don’t accept as an assumption, premise or tactic
that natural selection has “designed” individuals
who are best adapted to their environment? What
happens if you don’t accept phenotypic tracking
made possible by evolved cognitive abilities that
allow humans to perceive the relative efficiency of
various ways of acquiring resources? (The latter
establishes adaptive efficiency by arguing that the
human cognitive machinery has been “designed”
by natural selection to make optimal decisions).
Then you are left with interesting examples of how
at particular points in time and space, certain socioeconomic or cultural factors can help predict variation in fertility among men or women.
Here is where Winterhalder’s inference that I
distrust theories which emphasize mechanism (see
2002:17, Conclusions) is incorrect. What is problematic is the AEBE practice of stating the
mechanism(s) and proceeding to the ultimate

It is difficult to imagine containing the domain of AEBE if you also consider that there are different “proxies for fitness”
(see Joseph 2000:14). This allows for even further correlations and opportunities to expand the domain, which may
even further “surprise its practitioners.” However, an attempt to restrict the vast domain of AEBE (which seems to be
another exception that proves the rule) can be seen in qualifying discussions in anthropological evolutionary reproductive ecology which emphasize that while “cultural success” and “reproductive success” are correlated in “traditional and
historical populations,” they are not correlated in modern industrial societies (Voland 1998:352; see also Kaplan et al.
1995; Pérusse 1993; Vining 1986). However, the implicit or explicit claim is that (barring a few details) AEBE has
pretty much “explained” variation in reproductive behavior in “traditional and historical” societies. And thus, it seems
that the only real challenge which remains is to “explain” reproductive behavior in post-transitional societies (see
Vining 1998).
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol6/iss1/2 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.6.1.2
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adaptationist explanation. This has the effect (intended or unintended) of undermining socio-cultural and bio-physical environmental influences on
behavior since the goal is less about explaining hierarchical structural constraints or mechanisms
within these multiple environments, than demonstrating the assumed workings of adaptation. Likewise, Winterhalder (2002:11) incorrectly believes
I am criticizing the work of Jack Broughton, which
I do not do (see Joseph 2000:14-15). It is functional adaptationism and equating prediction with
explanation that I question: “all that matters [in
Boone and Smith’s (1998) discussion] is that the
optimal model predicts the same broadening of the
diet” (Joseph 2000:15). Thus, in as much as the
work of Jack Broughton or the work of practitioners from AEBE enhances our understanding of
the multiple environmental influences on behavior they are a contribution to ecological anthropology. However, in as much as theoretical arguments
uncritically rely on neo-Darwinian adaptationism to
interpret observable phenomena, they are suspect.
Winterhalder mentions another “safeguard”
against naïve adaptationism—methodological individualism. That is, Winterhalder claims that
AEBE incorporates a “focus on agents which (who)
actually have adaptive agency” (Winterhalder
2002:12). How does viewing human beings as economic optimizers or reproductive maximizers in
order to generate predictive statements take the role
of individual agency seriously? If your concern is
in demonstrating how individuals are largely acting out an adaptationist script, then the individual
as human agent is little more than a pawn with
little or no agency.
Another “safeguard” Winterhalder refers to
is insistence on “clearly specified hypothesis testing” (2002:12). However, as already discussed,
hypotheses in AEBE are problematic because one
is using assumptions to generate hypotheses—the
results of which are then interpreted in light of
those assumptions. This is what Bettinger refers to
as assuming one’s conclusions (see Joseph 2000:14).
Thus, what we have in AEBE is a situation of more
and more testing of hypotheses which will poten6
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tially lead to the accumulation of more and more
empirical data (and such empirical observations are
an important contribution to ecological anthropology) but in terms of concepts and frameworks
which guide scientific explanation, we are still left
with defunct adaptationist functionalist reasoning
or “just so stories.” Empirical observations or facts
don’t just interpret themselves (see the definition
of explanation in Section I).
Again, Winterhalder does not seem to understand that my criticism centers on the proper domain of AEBE. He seems to suggest that my criticisms are invalid if recent developments in the history of the field, particularly when studies which
employ complex techniques for modeling human
behavior, are taken into consideration (see
Winterhalder 2002:5,7).6
First, I agree that such models (e.g., game
theoretic or dynamic programming) can have heuristic value, provided that the extent to which they
rely on unverified assumptions is clearly stated from
the outset. Such models may help to illustrate the
need for empirical research to evaluate whether or
not certain assumptions of theory are tenable or
whether certain relationships in models are verified by empirical research. Such empirical research
can then prompt the rejection of overly facile conceptual constructs or point to the need for new
and more refined conceptual constructs, etc. However, the major trend in AEBE is that basic concepts and framework of theory are remaining virtually static and unchanged (neo-Darwinian
adaptationism as the principle explanatory framework is still justified in terms of assumptions about
optimality and adaptation), while new quantitative modeling techniques are increasingly incorporated into the theory. I do not believe
Winterhalder would propose that the solution to
theoretical conundrums of AEBE is to rely more
and more on mathematical models of behavior
rather than behavior itself! We cannot rely too
heavily on computers and complex techniques to
elevate theory. Here I agree with Winterhalder’s
later comments that more compelling data-rich
studies are needed (2000:9). I would add the fol-

Some of the examples to which Winterhalder refers post-date my critique.
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lowing: There is a further and even more pressing
need within AEBE to develop richer basic conceptual devices and theoretical framework(s). The assumptions of theory must themselves be subjected
to serious scientific study and evaluation.
Conclusions
Are the flaws of AEBE, which largely stem
from failure to specify a domain or what might be
termed “broad-stroke” adaptationism, best seen as
nails in the coffin (see Winterhalder 2002:12,18)
of the theory? No, but they do reinforce the old
saying: “if your only tool is a hammer, then everything looks like a nail.” AEBE failures will become
“coffin nails” if and only if past failures continue
to inform future theory-building. Many practitioners implicitly if not explicitly recognize the problems with neo-Darwinian adaptationism. However, the problematic ways in which conceptual
constructs in AEBE inform derived conceptual
devices, the interpretation of empirical observations
and the domain of theory have not been carefully
examined and worked out, and until they are theoretical refinement remains a distant prospect. I do
not suggest, either in my critique or here, that
AEBE be dismissed. AEBE has made important
contributions to ecological anthropology, particularly in empirical studies which have provided valu7
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able observations of human behavior and techniques for studying human behavior. Most notably, AEBE has identified some unique life history
traits of our species in what may be considered
confirmed generalizations of human reproductive
ecology (see Joseph 2000:18). However, the basic
conceptual devices and adaptationist framework
found in AEBE are problematic and have resulted
in serious disagreements over its proper domain in
anthropology. While it may seem that functionalism and adaptationism have plagued ecological
anthropology from its inception, this does not
mean that we cannot or have not established better safeguards against hyperfunctionalism or
adaptationism. For AEBE, perhaps the most sophisticated safeguard against crude adaptationism
is provided by Vayda (1995) who suggests trying
to establish historical causal chains7 (for a discussion see Joseph 2000:19-20). However, in addition to better safeguards, we need to pay more careful attention to the premises on which Darwin’s
biological theory of adaptation by natural selection is based. Many of these criteria are inapplicable to the evolutionary study of human sociocultural systems. First, in human ecosystems, reproductive or fertility behavior is shaped by both biology and culture. Likewise, the strict organism/
environment dichotomy8 is problematic in human

The role of history is something AEBE has traditionally undermined. AEBE’s definition of history is functional and
ahistorical (see Joseph 2000:21-24). Winterhalder simply dismisses my questions of AEBE’s conceptualization of history
and evolution by invoking Alfred Wallace’s fallacy of culture without-evolution (and vice versa) and suggests that “dual
inheritance” and other discussions within AEBE have already addressed the question. Within AEBE it seems that history
is largely a subset of a particular type of biological evolutionary change; i.e., natural selection-driven change. Likewise,
dual inheritance theory incorporates a narrow understanding and definition of history. History only refers to (1) “change
that does not repeat itself “(Boyd and Richerson 1992:185) or “the occurrence of long-term change” (ibid, 202); and (2)
a specific kind of change in which “similar initial conditions give rise to qualitatively different trajectories” (ibid, 186)–
that is, “the tendency of initially similar systems to diverge”(ibid, 202). Practitioners from dual inheritance theory argue
that we can accept as a premise that analogous cultural processes (to the biological process of natural selection) occur in
human societies and such processes can adequately explain important convergences in cultural evolution (e.g., the emergence of state-level societies in human history; see Boyd and Richerson 202-203). Again, we have to accept the premise
and ignore the problem of cultural selectionism and the structural properties of human socio-cultural systems. We also
have to ignore the fact that unlike biological evolution, in the evolution of sociocultural systems, ontogeny and phylogeny
are identical (see Hallpike 1988:33, 79). Ultimately, we must agree to the following: “If most of the historic context is
taken as given, Darwinian arguments can be very powerful heuristics” (Boyd and Richerson 1992:203). Not surprisingly,
history seems to have made a sudden exit. In order to further theoretical discussions surrounding these questions and
achieve “progress through criticism” wouldn’t it be more productive to actually engage in discussion over the definition
and role of history in AEBE (or in evolutionary ecology broadly defined) rather than casually brush-off such debates?
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sociocultural systems (Joseph 2000:22). In human
ecosystems, we do not only find individual actors
and their aggregations, but social institutions or
“organized systems of meaning bounded together
largely by information flows (Hallpike 1988:27)”
(Joseph 2000:22). This means that in addition to
refining AEBE, there is a need to incorporate and
develop additional theoretical structure in the study
of human evolution and ecology. Ultimately, such
an undertaking means that we must go beyond
critique. Section III provides some suggestions for
future theory-building. However, before proceeding to the final section, it is important to briefly
consider the role of critique in theory-building,
particularly since “critique as practice” figures
prominently in Winterhalder’s response.
Section II: Reply To Winterhalder’s Comments
on Critique as Practice
Defining Critique: It’s Role in Theory-building
Perhaps a great of deal of pain, frustration,
and misunderstanding surrounding critique comes
from failing to appreciate its uses and its limitations. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993) defines “critique” (the verb) as follows:
“discuss critically; write a critique of; make a critical assessment of ” and “critical” as “given to judging, esp. unfavourably; fault-finding; censorious.”
Thus, to critique is to pass judgement upon something with respect to its faults or merits, but it often connotes unfavourable judgement. When reading Winterhalder’s suggestions for effective progress
through critique, it seems that the onus of responsibility for achieving such progress is largely on the
critic. The critic must confess to her pet-theories,
offer alternatives to the theory under scrutiny, en8
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gage in a comparative critical evaluation of different theories but still engage the theory on its own
terms, provide a detailed overview of the history
of the theory being evaluated and then offer suggestions for reconstructing theory. Are these laudable ground rules for critique writing? (I mean, after
all, if you want a history of the field, wouldn’t it be
wiser to go read a history of the field?)
Winterhalder’s suggestions, however, fail to consider the possible ramifications of expanding the
definition of critique. Specifically, isn’t there a danger that if we put unprecedented demands on the
writing of critique, that the net effect will be to
discourage criticism? Practitioners of whatever
theory under scrutiny can then deflect criticism
by drawing attention away from problems with
theory and toward deficiencies in the practice of
critique writing or critic for that matter. It is vital
that we recognize the limitations of critique—that
it is a crucial part, but only a part of theory refinement and rebuilding. Perhaps the most valuable
contribution of critique toward the goal of theorybuilding, lies in the dialogue generated through criticism/response. Good discussion can help anthropologists evaluate strong/weak criticisms and identify where there is a need for further discussion. Effective dialogue requires a serious commitment and
mutual responsibility on the part of both critic and
criticized. There is also an implicit assumption on
the part of the critiquer and criticized that the reader
possesses some familiarity with the theory being
evaluated. The essential point is that without serious dialogue, theory-building via progress through
criticism is unlikely to occur. This reply is a further
attempt to clarify and refine critical arguments as
part of an ongoing dialogue and process of theorybuilding in ecological anthropology.

The organism/environment dichotomy requires making a clear distinction between a) what is doing the selecting and b)
what is being selected for (Hallpike 1988:57). If that which is doing the selecting is also that which is being selected for,
then you have forsaken the Darwinian process of natural selection and have invoked cultural selectionism instead (for a
discussion see Joseph 2000:22). Cultural selectionism is an example of misapplication of Darwinian theory to the study
of human socio-cultural systems. It has led to important disagreements over how best to account for some of the successful predictions of optimal behavior at specific temporal and spatial scales in human social evolution. Specifically, AEBE
has failed to consider how examples of “optimal” efficiency or “rational” behavior in human ecosystems are better
explained by alternative theories (e.g., structural Marxism) which recognize the influence of historically-specific sociocultural processes of capitalism (including subsidiary processes like mechanization) rather than the biological process of
natural selection (see Joseph 2000:15).
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Second, I disagree with Winterhalder’s caveat
of avoiding “criticism by proxy” in that we must
pay attention to earlier criticisms so that we don’t
just keep reinventing the wheel. However, I do
believe that we should build on previous good criticisms and try to elevate the level of theoretical discussion. By utilizing the method for theory developed by PK&J, critics can locate their criticisms
in terms of specific components of theory, rather
than simply providing an endless laundry list of
flaws. This helps put similar criticisms (of the same
components of theory) together and allows more
precise identification of the weaknesses and
strengths of a given theory. I believe that the PK&J
method for theory is an invaluable tool for achieving progress through criticism and the broader goal
of bringing about theoretical integration in ecological anthropology.
The last point I would like to add is that if
critique is to be effective, it should never be personal. Criticism should be aimed at deconstructing
theory not individuals. I took great pains not to
make my critique personal. This is why I framed
my criticisms as criticisms of “AEE” or “AEBE”
and refer to examples as examples from “practitioners.” Individual practitioners cannot and should
not be reduced to theoretical straw men or women
which critics then proceed to take apart. Sometimes in anthropology, criticisms specifically target individuals as if the main point of the entire
endeavor is to bring down an individual or at least
cast doubt on his/her competency, as opposed to
evaluate theory. I mention this because
Winterhalder states that I never point out in the
criticisms I raise whether or not the person who
made the criticism is sympathetic or unsympathetic
to the theory. I do not believe that it is relevant to
characterize the sympathies of every individual
concerned. The merits of a criticism should not be
based on whether or not the criticism was raised
by a practitioner, nonpractitioner, sympathizer or
unsympathizer. Likewise, flaws in theory are not
attributable to the flaws of individuals, but to the
structural components of theory. With that said,
it is a barrier to progress to simply ignore or dismiss critical nonpractitioners who are labeled “unsympathetic” (although, I am still not sure I un-
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derstand what this means). If we take our role as
ecological anthropologists seriously, we should be
willing to engage in dialogue over general or specific theoretical disagreements/agreements raised
in critique writing/response. The question remains,
what fundamental theoretical questions should
guide anthropologists interested in the study of
human evolution and ecology?
Section III: Toward a More Inclusive Human
Evolutionary Ecology
I have argued that “unleashing the power of
Darwinism” cannot simply be justified by a series
of unverified assumptions or by premises, which,
upon close examination, turn out to be of highly
questionable applicability to human sociocultural
systems. Thus, parallel to the need to refine and
limit the domain of AEBE, is a need for a new
more inclusive human evolutionary ecology, one
that goes beyond adaptationism, and one that not
only focuses on the ways in which humans are just
like other species, but also the ways in which humans are another unique species.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 in Joseph (2000) were attempts to graphically represent what a more inclusive human evolutionary ecology would look like.
But perhaps more importantly these figures attempt
to identify contributions to and initial suggestions
for the study of human evolution and ecology. They
suggest a need for theoretical frameworks which
incorporate hierarchy, multiple causality and multiple environments. Also needed are conceptual
constructs which account for the existence of empirical phenomena (behaviors and structures) in
socio-cultural evolution which are suboptimal (in
terms of their functional efficiency; e.g., Hallpike’s
concept of “Survival of the Mediocre” [1988:81145]). These are only initial suggestions, and ultimately hope to reaffirm the central role of ecological anthropology in addressing a fundamental question at the very heart of anthropology: how do
human ecosystems differ from nonhuman ecosystems? Attempts to highlight the unique properties
of human ecosystems and unique processes in human socio-cultural evolution are apparent in both
anthropology, sociology and history (for an example in history see Mandelbaum 1971; for ex-

https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol6/iss1/2 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.6.1.2

Vol. 6 2002

Joseph / Reply to Winterhalder

35

amples in sociology see Giddens 1981, 1984; “critical [4]” The new shorter Oxford English
Zeitlin 1973; Sanderson 1990,1999; for examples
dictionary on historical principles.
in anthropology see Flannery 1972; Rappaport
Volume 1. Edited by L. Brown.
1984; Hallpike 1988; Tainter 1988; Stepp and
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
Kuchka 2001). Addressing this larger fundamen- “critique” The new shorter Oxford English
tal question of ecological anthropology will require
dictionary on historical principles.
greater attention to the components of theory, parVolume 1. Edited by L. Brown.
ticularly the domain of different theories or subOxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
theories and far greater interdisciplinary and CRONK, L.
intradisciplinary (i.e., between biological and cul1991a Human behavioral ecology. Annual
tural anthropologists) collaboration.
Review of Anthropology 20:25-53.
1991b Wealth, status, and reproductive
References
success among the Mukogodo of
ALLEN, T. F. H., AND T. W. HOEKSTRA.
Kenya. American Anthropologist
1992 Towards a unified ecology. New York:
93:345-360.
Columbia University Press.
1994 Is there a role for culture in human
BETZIG, L.
behavioral ecology? Ethology and
1988 “Mating and parenting in Darwinian
Sociobiology 16:181-205.
perspective,” in Human reproductive
DARWIN, C.
behavior. Edited by L. L. Betzig, M.
1859(1909) The origin of species. The
Borgerhoff-Mulder and P. W. Turke,
Harvard Classics Series. Edited by
pp. 3-20. Cambridge: Cambridge
C.W. Eliot. New York: P.F. Collier.
University Press.
HALLPIKE, C. R.
BONGAARTS, J., AND R. G. POTTER.
1988 The principles of social evolution.
1983 Fertility, biology and behavior: An
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
analysis of proximate determinants.
FLANNERY, K.
New York: Academic.
1972 The cultural evolution of civilizaBORGERHOFF-MULDER, M.
tions. Annual Review of Ecology and
1987 On cultural and reproductive success:
Systematics 3:399-426.
Kipsigis evidence. American AnthroFRICKE, T. E.
pologist 89: 617-634.
1990 Darwinian transitions? A comment.
BOYD, R., AND P. J. RICHERSON.
Population and Development Review
1985 Culture and evolutionary process.
16(1):107-119.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. GIDDENS, A.
1992 “How microevolutionary processes
1981 A contemporary critique of historical
give rise to history,” in History and
materialism. Berkeley: University of
evolution. Edited by M. H. Nitecki
California Press.
and D.V. Nitecki, pp. 179-209.
GIDDENS, A.
Albany: State University of New York.
1984 The constitution of society. Berkeley:
CAMPBELL, K. L., AND J. W. WOOD.
University of California Press.
1988 “Fertility in traditional societies,” in
HILL, K. AND A. M. HURTADO.
Natural human fertility: Social and
1996 Ache life history: The ecology and
biological determinants. Edited by P.
demography of a foraging people. New
Diggory, M. Potts and S. Teper, pp.
York: Aldine De Gruyter.
39-69. London: Macmillan.

36

Journal of Ecological Anthropology

JOSEPH, S.
2000 Anthropological evolutionary ecology: A critique. Journal of Ecological
Anthropology 4: 6-30.
KAPLAN, H., J. LANCASTER, J. BOCK, AND S.
JOHNSON.
1995 “Fertility and fitness among Albuquerque men: A competitive labor
market theory,” in Human reproductive decisions: Biological and social
perspectives. Edited by R. I. M.
Dunbar, pp. 96-136. London:
Macmillan.
KUHN, T. S.
1977 “Objectivity, value judgement, and
theory choice,” in The essential
tension: Selected studies in scientific
tradition and change. Edited by T. S.
Kuhn, pp. 320-339. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
LLOYD, E. A.
1988 The structure and confirmation of
evolutionary theory. New York: Greenwood Press
2001 “Why do people find evolutionary
psychology so compelling?” Paper
presented at the meeting of the
International Society for the History,
Philosophy, and Social Studies of
Biology. Quinnipiac University,
Hamden, CT. 2001.
LOW, B.
1990 Occupational status, landownership,
and reproductive behavior in 19thcentury Sweden: Tuna Parish. American Anthropologist 92: 457-468.
MANDELBAUM, M.
1971 History, man, and reason: A study in
nineteenth-century thought. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
MAYR, E.
1993 One long argument: Charles Darwin
and the genesis of modern evolutionary
thought. London: Penguin Books.

Vol. 6 2002

MCMULLIN, E.
1983 Values in science. Philosophy of Science
Association 2:3-28.
PÉRUSSE, D.
1993 Cultural and reproductive success in
industrial societies: Testing the
relationship at the proximate and
ultimate levels. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 16:267-322.
PICKETTT, S. T. A., J. KOLASA, AND C. G. JONES.
1994 Ecological understanding: The nature
of theory and the theory of nature.
New York: Academic Press.
RAPPAPORT, R. A.
1984 Pigs for the ancestors: Ritual in the
ecology of a New Guinea People (New,
enlarged edition). New Haven: Yale
University Press.
SALMON, W. C.
1984 Scientific explanation and the causal
structure of the world. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
SANDERSON, S. K.
1990 Social evolutionism: A critical history.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
1999 Social transformations: A general theory
of historical development (Expanded
edition). Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, inc.
STEPP, J. R., AND H. E. KUCHKA.
2001 “Unique and remarkable properties of
human ecosystems,” Paper presented
at the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association.
Washington, DC. 2001.
TAINTER, J.A.
1988 The collapse of complex societies. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
TURKE, P. W.
1988 “Helpers at the nest: Childcare
networks on Ifaluk,” in Human
reproductive behavior. Edited by L. L.
Betzig, M. Borgerhoff-Mulder, and P.
W. Turke, pp. 173-188. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol6/iss1/2 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.6.1.2

Vol. 6 2002

Joseph / Reply to Winterhalder

1989 Evolution and the demand for
children. Population and Development
Review 15:61-90.
TROUT, J. D.
1991 “Reductionism and the unity of
science,” in The philosophy of science.
Edited by R. Boyd, P. Gasper, and J.
D. Trout, pp. 387-392. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
VAYDA, A.
1995 Failures of explanation in Darwinian
ecological anthropology: Part I. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 25(2): 219-249.
VOLAND, E.
1998 Evolutionary ecology of human
reproduction. Annual Review of
Anthropology 27:347-374.
VINING, JR., D. R.
1986 Social versus reproductive success:
The central theoretical problem of
sociobiology. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 9:167-216.

37

WILSON, M., AND DALY, M.
1997 Life expectancy, economic inequality,
homicide, and reproductive timing in
Chicago neighbourhoods. British
Medical Journal 314(7089): 1271-1274.
WINTERHALDER, B.
1986 Diet choice, risk, and food sharing in a
stochastic environment. Journal of
Anthropological Archaeology 5:369-392.
2002 Behavioral and other human ecologies: Critique, response and progress
through criticism. Journal of Ecological Anthropology 6:4-23.
WOOD, J. W.
1990 Fertility in anthropological populations. Annual Review of Anthropology
19:211-242.
ZEITLIN, I. M.
1973 Rethinking sociology: A critique of
contemporary theory. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

